• 93% of companies in the S&P 500 have reported earnings with current TTM As Reported EPS (AREPS) at $87.66, reflecting a decline of 2.4% on an inflation adjusted basis; peak cycle earnings on an inflation adjusted basis remain at $89.97 set in February of 2012.
• 10-year Cyclically Adjusted Price-to-Earning (CAPE) based on recent S&P 500 prices stands at 24.0X compared to 21.8X a year ago; multiple expansion driven by a year-over-year price index increase of 17.6%, offset by 9% growth in CAPE earnings.
• Forward earnings expectations reflect outsized growth of 25.5% and 22.9% on a nominal and real basis, respectively; this is in stark contrast to the recent deceleration of recent earnings relative to its 10-year trend.
• Aggressive monetary policy remains the major catalyst supporting a constructive outlook on the equity markets and likely already discounted based on elevated valuations.
• Recent earnings trends, questionable economic data, and imbalances in the financial and economic landscape suggest current growth expectations will not be met and risks remain to the down side.
• Despite recent strength in defensive sectors, investors should be selective and focus on higher quality names with long track records of dividend and earnings growth through entire business cycles

For the complete article please follow the link.

Volatility is the measure of the dispersion (range of results) around an average.  The wider the dispersion/range then the higher the volatility measure.  In finance, volatility is a measure of risk.  We view volatility as part of the risk equation.  Increased volatility creates scenarios where true risk could be realized and that is loss of capital. This happens in situation such as 1) when investors must draw down an investment portfolio as depressed levels and 2) create an emotional roller coaster ride which leads to investors selling assets at the worst time.  Thus avoiding volatility is a handy tool to help remove the true risk of capital losses.

From Morningstar:

The Low-Volatility Strategy 

Low-volatility stocks tend to be big, boring, and dividend-paying. H.J. Heinz is a classic example. Boom or bust, Heinz ketchup sells with clockwork regularity, insulating Heinz’s earnings from the business cycle. Stocks like Heinz are as bondlike as they can get. Interestingly, in nearly every market studied, low-volatility stocks have greatly outperformed high-volatility stocks on a risk-adjusted basis, a finding at odds with many investors’ notions of risk and return.

There are three compelling reasons why this may be the case. The best is leverage aversion. Investors who target above-market returns may be unwilling or unable to use leverage to reach their expected-return targets. By resorting to volatile stocks (more accurately, high-beta stocks), which theoretically should outperform less-volatile stocks, they hope to earn above-average profits. Ironically, their collective bet on high-beta stocks leads to low risk-adjusted returns. Another is the fact that high-volatility stocks are systematically overpriced by investors seeking “lottery tickets”–stocks with a small chance of huge upside (Tesla Motors (TSLA), for example). Finally, asset managers tied to benchmarks and unable to employ leverage actually have a disincentive to own low-volatility stocks with below-average expected returns, regardless of how fabulous the expected risk-adjusted returns may be, and an incentive to own high-volatility stocks with above-benchmark expected returns, even if their prospective risk-adjusted returns are terrible

The Morningstar analyst goes on to highlight various ETFs (Exchange Traded Funds) that one can invest in to achieve a low-volatility investment strategy.  For those interested in low-volatility ETFs, I would suggest reviewing the PowerShares ETF line up, which has expanded its low-volatility ETF availability to include both international and emerging market regions and now by market cap size.

In modern psychology, cognitive dissonance is the feeling of discomfort when simultaneously holding two or more conflicting cognitions: ideas, beliefs, values or emotional reactions. In a state of dissonance, people may sometimes feel “disequilibrium”: frustration, hunger, dread, guilt, anger, embarrassment, anxiety, etc.

Now how about these headlines appearing today on popular financial news sites:

Cyprus is euro zone’s very own Lehman moment

Buy ‘Still Cheap’ US Stocks, Ignore Cyprus: Pro

If that doesn’t create dissonance I don’t know what will. From “The Psychology of Investing” by John Nofsinger

Investors seek to reduce psychological pain by adjusting their beliefs about the success of past investment choices.  For example, at one point in time, an investor will make a decision to purchase a mutual fund.  Over time, performance information about the fund will either validate or put into question the wisdom of picking that mutual fund.  To reduce cognitive dissonance, the investor’s brain will filter out or reduce the negative information and fixate on the positive information….

I bring this up because depending on what market valuation tools an investor could argue that today’s stock market is undervalued (Fed Model) or overvalued (Shiller PE10).  Likely depending on your “ideas, beliefs, values” you are likely to focus on one or the other.  From John Hussman and his weekly note sums it up:

“No market condition is permanent, and even the late-1990’s advance included periods where favorable trend-following measures were not joined by hostile syndromes of overbought, overbullish conditions. If you believe that stocks will continue to advance in the months and years ahead, with no intervening bear market decline, those instances are the main points where “don’t fight the trend” might outweigh negative return/risk considerations more generally. For longer-term investors, consider the prospective return you can expect to achieve over time if you are buying, and that you can expect to forego if you are selling. Compare this with your tolerance for volatility, missed short-term returns, and deep interim losses. All of this is what I know and believe. It’s fine to believe something else. But please – insist on supporting evidence and long-term data. The Tinker Bell approach just won’t cut it.“

And that Tinker Bell approach is created in my opinion by the cognitive dissonance just discussed.  How you consider Cyprus might be telling of your own view? I focus on Shiller PE10 and believe this is the most pragmatic way to approach investing given that the business cycle exists and there will always be ups and downs.  I believe Cyprus is a risk but it hasn’t changed my investment strategy nor should it change yours.  Your strategy should be able to coexist with such issues otherwise investment returns will likely be negatively impacted.

As shown in figure 1, the S&P 500 Industrial sector (XLI) as a group has underperformed the broad market since 1H’11. Since October of last year, the group has shown some improvement against the overall index.

continued …. click here

I was interested to catch some recent commentary from bogleheads (named after Jack Bogle of Vanguard fame) on the Shiller PE10. The thread can be found here.

One interesting note that came out of the thread besides some heavy hitters in the passive index investment world providing commentary was a research paper by Vanguard titled “Forecasting Stock Returns”.  Notice (image provided below) that the Shiler PE 10 while argued to be of some value, had the highest R-squared value at .43. Therefore of the group, it is still the best indicator for long-term future stock returns despite the figure title.

From Harvey Campbell in a paper on global tactical allocations:

"Predictability is often assessed via so-called R-squares in regressions. An R-square measures how much of the variation in returns that can be attributed to the conditional information variables.  It is common to find predictability of between 1% and 10% in terms of R-squares (depending on which type of asset, market, or sample period that is considered). Predictability has been shown to be particularly strong at longer horizons (3-5 years), with R-squares as high as 30%."

The paper goes on to discuss predictability ...

"In fact, one does not need much predictability to impact the asset allocation process.  Kandel and Stambaugh (1996) find that even with low precision (an R-square of only 2%), asset allocation can be dramatically altered as a result of the predictions. ... That is, moderate predictability can be of large economic importance."

Global Tactical Asset Allocation by Magnus Dahlquist and Campbell R. Harvey (Jan 31, 2001)

Now I understand one is relating to future returns and the other to business cycle and asset allocations -- but, I believe the negative view from Vanguard relates to the inability to capture the cyclicality of  the investment time period.  I believe that to explain future returns one would be required to include additional conditional information to fine tune expectations such as interest rates etc.

This pragmatist says that now is not the time to shelve CAPE and the rest of the note explains the risks if you do. To quote George Santayana:

Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it

To continue reading …. click here

Continued (Seeking Alpha link) …

Lawrence Fuller’s article provides a link to an eloquent description of a secular bear and bull market, by Barton Biggs. As an investor, the following passage by Mr. Biggs regarding valuations is important to note:

Secular bear markets in the past have always taken valuations back to the levels at which the preceding bull market started, or even lower. Price to book value is the most stable measure of value, because it is not sensitive to the cyclical swings of the economy as all measures of earnings are.

At the end of the last secular bear market in 1982 – the Shiller CAPE bottomed at 6.6X in July of 1982. For the entire year of 1982, the Shiller CAPE averaged 7.4X. In the months surrounding the 2009 bottom, which some are defining as the start of a new secular bull market – the Shiller CAPE low of 13.3X was set in March 2009 and the average around that low was 15.9X. Clearly by Mr. Biggs’ definition, valuations in 2009 did not go low enough.

Continued (link to Seeking Alpha) ….

Therefore it is no surprise to see companies tied to the housing market do well in the equity markets. These often become story stocks that are bought as ways to benefit from certain trends such as the aforementioned housing market recovery. It is questionable how much attention is actually paid towards valuation or fundamentals in these situations. In our universe of companies that fall into the “high quality” realm as rated by Standard & Poor’s – Sherwin-Williams (SHW) is one of those companies.

Continued ….

Therefore I found the following comments from Steven Romick, portfolio manager of the FPA Crescent Fund, regarding one of their equity investments as an “infinite duration bond”.  I think this is a great concept that should be discussed more.  There are a few theoretical papers out there that attempt to measure the duration of equities and even an index like the S&P 500.  So while I would argue infinite might be extreme, the concept is still valid.

The bottom line is that when you see an investor such as Warren Buffett take on significant leverage to purchase and “infinite duration bond” such as H.J. Heinz Company then you get the sense that it is a real concept that should be better understood.